SLURP-5 | Solidify SDL Supply Economics

SLURPs
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Abstract

We propose implementing contract changes to the stake.link protocol to a) mint 235,000,000 SDL tokens (resulting in a total supply of 500,000,000 SDL), b) permanently remove the ability to mint SDL, and c) enable ability to claw back locked SDL assigned to Node Operators.

Rationale

Benefits

  • Transparency: The stake.link DAO enters a “burn only” era where the total SDL supply can only ever be reduced, protecting participant concentration and improving confidence for existing and prospective participants.
  • Value: Establish the “Stake.link Platform Upgrade Reserve” (SPUR) with the purpose of incentivizing Providers to issue contributions to the SDL platform, which are forecasted to lead to a net increase of a) SDL utility, b) rewards per SDL, and/or c) SDL value. Example incentives may include: onboarding Chainlink node operators, onboarding validators for future staking protocols, and/or contributing technologies or protocols to the platform, etc.
  • Adaptability: Enables platform to respond to not-yet-known market conditions to iterate, scale, and pivot as necessary while also providing a graceful mechanism for offboarding Node Operators (“Providers”) in the event of an exit (whether involuntarily via governance, or voluntarily)

Motivation

What prompted this proposal?

The current model establishes no upper-limit of supply and relies on future minting of SDL in order to incorporate additional value propositions to the platform.

While the intention of any SDL mint (for objectives SPUR is now intentended to serve) is aligned with the forelying objectives (net increase of SDL utility, rewards per SDL and SDL value), naturally this provided minimal predictability for when and by how much the supply of SDL would increase, culminating in reasonable uncertainty from current and prospective platform participants as well as concerns around unreasonable dilution not commensurate with increased value.

A few solutions have been examined to solve these problems. One such solution was to potentially eliminate the Treasury altogether and mint SDL on demand per each governance proposal. While this may solve aspects of the problem statement, it does not solve the upper-limit problem, and also creates a few problems of its own (e.g., establishing a discretionary fund vs. inefficiencies of requiring governance approval for every usage of SDL, however small).

This current proposal was the result of collaboration with Providers, Governing Council members, and community members. We believe this most efficiently solves the problems of participant confidence and protection whilst adding flexibility for the type of growth in the platform that maximally benefits all participants. We also believe a maximum total supply is healthy for any project, as it creates transparency and accountability for usage of funds (e.g., Treasury and SPUR).

What went into the decision process to align on an initial 500M total supply?

Building a novel platform in a nascent industry provides one with at best an unpredictable environment and at worst a volatile one. We believe it is far too early in the Chainlink ecosystem, the Web3 infrastructure ecosystem, the greater DeFI ecosystem, and the entire crypto ecosystem as a whole – all of which we intend to participate in – to make decisions regarding supply that may prematurely inhibit the future success of the platform.

We’ve speculated about issuing 5-8M SDL per Chainlink Node Operator for the next batch of Providers that join the platform. Supposing a batch of 15 joined, this could be anywhere from 75-120M. The only way in which this amount of SDL would be approved is if it would clearly result in an increase of rewards per SDL based on the additional LINK staking capacity (and therefore LINK staked) afforded by the new round of Providers. That said, Chainlink Staking is still in V0.1 and there are many factors at play to which we are not yet privy that could inform different economics around the amount of SDL per Provider. The platform must remain flexible to changing market conditions in such a way that it is able to secure additional staking capacity, regardless of how. The long-term success of the platform, as it relates to Chainlink liquid staking, hinges on securing exponentially more LINK than the current 750,000 limit.

Beyond this, the vision of the platform is to be The Consortium of Node Operators and Validators, agnostic to any one protocol or chain. We can envision partnership opportunities with other such validators, networks or protocols that result in a net value addition to platform participants. Some of these opportunities may require SDL incentives to secure the partnership. We could envision 10-20 such opportunities over the span of many years, perhaps each opportunity ranging between 3-7M SDL tokens (30-140M total).

While these types of opportunities would be funded by SPUR, there are other use cases which would come from the Treasury, such as centralized exchange listing, marketing opportunities, strategic partnership, legal structuring of the DAO, advisory services, etc. While proposals may be made to allocate SDL from Treasury to SPUR, the inverse is generally not the intended case, which means we’d rather err on too much to the Treasury than too much to SPUR (as this can be more naturally remedied by subsequent proposals).

Given the above, we’ve proposed 200,000,000 SDL be minted to SPUR and another 35,000,000 to the Treasury. SPUR usage will require a SLURP, including specific metrics and KPIs on how the proposal will add value to the platform, will be required to authorize any disbursement from SPUR. Treasury usage in excess of 250,000 SDL will require a SLURP detailing intended usage.

The intention with this supply is to maintain maximal flexibility to respond to changes in the ecosystem, with an intention to burn SDL in the future if and when it is determined it is not required (either from Treasury or SPUR). We believe it is more fiscally responsible to with an abundance of caution secure the future financial interest of the platform with the ability to burn the supply down rather than prematurely burn too much of the supply with good intentions but unacceptable repercussions for all participants.

Why Implement Clawbacks for Providers?

From time-to-time, a Provider may exit the platform, whether voluntarily or involuntarily (in the latter case, via governance). In such cases, the locked SDL will be claimed by the DAO and repurposed.

In the current model of minting SDL on demand for new disbursements, the mechanics of executing this did not require a clawback feature, in that the locked SDL would be burned and new SDL allocations could be minted to new Providers joining the platform.

In this proposed model, by removing the ability to mint SDL, if the Provider locked SDL is burned, it would reduce the total supply without providing recourse for the ability to replace that Provider (e.g., new Provider joining the platform). Therefore, the Delegator contractor which stores the locked SDL for Providers will be upgraded to add a new method for claiming the locked SDL from the Provider back to SPUR (executable upon governance).

Why Implement Clawbacks for the SDL Airdrop Pool?

SLURP-3 defined an Airdrop with a claim period expiring October 15, 2023. According to SLURP-3, this amount would be burned. Similar to clawbacks for Providers, with disabling the ability to mint SDL, we believe each burn of SDL should be made thoughtfully and with explicitly defined objectives. The intention of this proposal is to set a supply of 500,000,000 SDL until such a time to propose a burn of future SDL tokens. Therefore, rather than burning unclaimed SDL from the Airdrop as of October 15, 2023, this proposal aims to claim that SDL back to the Treasury with the objective of preserving an exact supply of 500,000,000.

Specification

Implementation:

  • Create SPUR Multi-Sig with same governance signers as the stake.link Treasury Multi-Sig (“Treasury”)
  • Mint 200,000,000 SDL to SPUR
  • Mint 35,000,000 SDL to Treasury
  • Execute renounceOwnership on SDL Contract to burn ability to mint SDL tokens
  • Upgrade Delegator contract to add claim method for locked provider SDL that claims the SDL back to SPUR
  • Update circulating supply API to exclude SPUR

Process Changes

  • Any initiative requiring a Treasury disbursement greater than or equal to 250,000 SDL will require a SLURP
  • Any initiative requiring a SPUR disbursement will require a SLURP
  • On or after October 15, 2023 at 00:00 UTC (the 180 day claim period for SLURP-3’s “SDL Airdrop” ), direct unclaimed SDL to the Treasury

Resulting Total Supply Distribution:

  • Providers (e.g., Node Operators): 165,000,000
  • Ecosystem Partners: 20,000,000
  • Treasury: 84,581,136*
  • SPUR: 200,000,000
  • Community: 30,418,864*
  • TOTAL Supply: 500,000,000

Estimated Circulating Supply Distribution:

  • Providers: 1,643,397.96*
  • Ecosystem Partners: 0
  • Treasury: 0
  • SPUR: 0
  • Community: 29,187,842.97648938*
  • TOTAL Circulating: 30,831,240.93648938
  • As a percent of total supply: ~6.17%

Special Notations on Supply

  • Total Supply
    • Treasury may be greater and Community lesser respective to the unclaimed SDL as of October 15, 2023 00:00 UTC
  • Circulating Supply
    • Providers were issued 1% unlocked SDL as of December 5, 2023 at token launch. The aforementioned circulating number represents the sum balance for all Providers as of the draft of this article. All other locked tokens (which will now not vest according to SLURP-4) do not count towards circulating supply
    • Community may be higher, respective to additional claimed SDL tokens since the draft of this article from the LPL to SDL Migration Contract (which are not counted towards circulating until claimed)

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

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There has developed a delineation between locked “nopSDL” and liquid SDL/stSDL. What about converting NOPs’ locked stSDL to nopSDL (which would have the same governance power as SDL), minting nopSDL to a new operator after an accepted proposal, burning nopSDL if a node leaves, and rather than tying NOPs’ rewards to their share of stSDL, their rewards would instead be proportionate to the revenue they generate, using verifiable on-chain metrics? Liquid stSDL would receive a share of rewards representing 3 nodes, each with average revenue (determined by the average revenue of the actual NOPs).

The exact analytical procedure to be determined - I would think that Chainlink Functions and Space and Time could be used for this purpose, but they are still in Beta. Treasury could still be funded and used for initiatives as proposed. Mint function deleted, SDL supply capped. nopSDL mint would be under governance control.

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@Fox How would you describe the problem statement this is solving, and in what ways does it benefit the protocol?

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There are two problems, the first being what I believe prompted this SLURP to begin with, which is the perceived problem with having what is technically an unlimited supply, though in practice there is no material difference between having a large reserve of SDL and minting them on demand. It’s not a problem I really care about, but this would solve it anyway.

The other problem is one that has mildly bothered me since the beginning, which is the idea that new NOPs will receive an allocation of tokens proportionate to what we believe their “value add” would be, but what does that mean in terms of hard numbers? Would it not make more sense (thinking long term here) to build a mechanism that rewards node operators based on their measurable contributions, rather than proportionate to the number of stSDL tokens they hold? I realize this is a technically demanding request and it’s not something I expect to exist any time soon. I believe on the NOPs side, very little would change in terms of what is already expected from using the platform - socialized slashing, easy access to cross-chain collateral, and the ability to direct stLINK integration into DeFi, but with this change there would be a clearer process for how their performance is judged and how their rewards are disbursed.

On the liquid SDL/stSDL staker side, it was already expected that platform revenue would be shared with liquid stSDL stakers, I don’t recall the current % split but I arrived at the “liquid SDL/stDL = 3 nodes” number from the “Resulting Total Supply Distribution” table in Eric’s post, which put the “community” supply distribution at just shy of 20% of the NOPs’ supply, divided by 15, that arrives at the equivalent of approximately 3 nodes (yes I rounded up). Stakers do not provide node services but their collateral is nonetheless desirable and SDL is at turns a driver of LINK coming to the platform (and therefore stLINK being created), of LINK staking allocations being fairly distributed (since we know that staking space will be limited and competitive), and rewards could be viewed as a form of passive slashing insurance obtained by staking stSDL.

Rather than trying to force what seem to be dissimilar needs into the same tokenomics, I would think that retaining NOPs governance power and relegating revenue sharing to a more transparent mechanism would make up for their lack of stSDL - their tokens are currently already locked anyway. If there is concern that the lack of stSDL means nodes can no longer make proposals to unlock some tokens later on to sell, perhaps the newly empowered Treasury could cover those needs instead.

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@Fox So to summarize, you see two problems:

  1. You assess there’s not a material difference between large supply without mint capability vs. minting on demand.
  2. You assess that the proposed economics of stake.link can be achieved without issuing SDL to Nops.

If that’s correct, a few thoughts:

  1. Many folks would disagree on this assessment (and some might agree with you). But since it’s not a critical problem in your opinion, let’s focus on the latter point.
  2. Without SDL, and strictly providing governance and revenue per work provided, what incentives do Providers have to join the platform such that the platform exists to begin with? If Providers are just receiving passthrough income less a fee, why not just stake that themselves directly since the platform isn’t providing anything of additional value to them, but instead leaving them with less revenue?
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Is that not how it already is? By joining the platform it is assumed that a node will make “less revenue” in the sense that it will be sharing with the other nodes and with liquid stSDL stakers. The platform revenue split as currently implemented would be decided by each node’s stSDL allotment, which would have nothing to do with their measurable activity, instead being an estimate of what we “think” they are doing.

As mentioned above, the other benefits remain re:slashing, access to collateral, and governance over the largest LINK LSD, the nodes would still be drawing revenue from the platform at approximately the same rate they were before (since it is currently assumed that new nodes would receive stSDL allotments “proportionate to what they will bring to the platform”), and if the Treasury suggestion is acceptable, they would still have access to liquid SDL for whatever purpose they propose.

The intent here isn’t to radically change anything about how the platform is supposed to work, but since the SLURP seems to be about bringing clarity to the tokenomics, it makes a great deal of sense to me to separate the revenue mechanism to something measurable, rather than tying it to the token supply.

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Thanks for further clarifying. The current suggestion is that when a Provider wishes to join in the future, their SDL allocation will be based on measurable performance (e.g., SPUR proposals). To confirm my understanding, your proposal argues this approach is unsatisfactory and recommends implementing a separate mechanism for compensating Providers, while distributing SDL airdrops to them on an ad hoc basis if necessary to maintain incentives – the result of which would be ~30M SDL supply plus any treasury amount, owned wholly by the community.

While your intentions are commendable, potential implications of your proposal include increased technical, legal, and incentive alignment risks, as well as the overall complexity of the system. How would you present this to the current 15 Providers in such a way that they are incentivized to vote yes to it as well?

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In terms of why NOPs might consider this change: it would make reward disbursement transparent to all participants and prospective participants, it would ensure overperforming nodes are not undercompensated and underperforming nodes are not overcompensated, and reduce governance proposals attempting to balance these fluctuations. The analytic process would be determined as an agreement between nodes and could itself be adjusted if necessary through governance.

Chainlink tooling seems ideal for the purpose of programmatically disbursing funds based on performance, and as a network of Chainlink nodes I would consider it both good practice and good advertisement to make use of the services nodes provide to the public. Some of this tooling was not available at the time SDL’s tokenomics were originally devised, and some of the technology is still in Beta, but we can prepare to use it as we await the rollout of true staking.

Just to further formalize what I’m proposing:

  • Locked stSDL for governance => Locked nopSDL for governance

  • Proposals to unlock stSDL for compensation => proposals to take SDL from Treasury for compensation (we could still call these proposals SPUR because it’s a good name)

  • Revenue shared proportionate to locked stSDL => Revenue shared according to the output of a smart contract, with an analytical process determined by the node operators themselves, with liquid (or “community”) stSDL representing 3 nodes of average performance

If there are legal issues, then it’s a nonstarter. If “node contribution” cannot be quantified and measured in the way that I’m suggesting, also a nonstarter. If nodes prefer to relegate this matter to the governance loop rather than relying on a smart contract, fair enough.

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Isn’t it a bit disingenious to phrase it this way when in fact you are essentially doubling (!) the supply of SDL?

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If the total amount of SDL is capped, what happens when the total allowance of new tokens is used up onboarding NOPs and the newly minted tokens run out and new NOPs want to join?

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Well said Fox. Helpful to understand the essence of the problems you’re looking to solve. To summarize, you are advocating for:

  • Increased Transparency
  • Fair Compensation
  • Adjustable Process

I would note that all three of these may be achieved in the proposed model, albeit with different mechanisms. We could debate the pros and cons of those mechanisms, but I’d like to highlight a critical challenge to your proposal.

A fundamental aspect of the SDL token’s design is its threefold utility: remuneration mechanism, governance, and priority access. By removing Providers from SDL and compensating them through a Smart Contract, these fees would be directed to the Provider Smart Contract. This results in a critical decision, to direct or not direct a portion of the stLINK fee to the SDL token. Candidly, neither of these options are tenable, in that the former chiefly violates the utility principle and the latter is clearly not in the interest of the platform.

The synergy between Providers and community is critical to the long-term success of the platform. Each group contributes distinct value to the token, protocol, and platform, which collectively underpin long-term growth. Separating Providers from the token disrupts this fundamental relationship at its core.

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Of the fees directed to the Provider smart contract, some would be directed to the phantom “3 nodes of average performance” representing the stSDL supply. I don’t believe what I’m proposing is very different from what is already expected: the current stSDL pool is shared between node operators and “liquid” stSDL stakers, and the latter is expected to receive a share of stLINK fees, as if they were collectively a node.

Since I’m proposing a move toward measurement and disbursement via smart contract, the question became how to adequately quantify the contribution of SDL stakers. “3 nodes” is a number more or less pulled out of a hat — is it fair? The fixed number is intended to simulate the current system, where liquid SDL would be diluted by new node operators, but overall platform revenue should increase.

As far as utility is concerned, I don’t think we can graft “utility” onto a token by forcing it to represent something for which the token’s value and demand are fundamentally irrelevant. The value, scarcity, whatever of SDL has no bearing on how nodes perform and how they should be adequately remunerated by platform fees.

The current system that splits revenue proportionate to stSDL holdings does not measure tangible node activity, and it introduces uncertainty about how nodes will join and leave the platform: first with the mint function and effectively uncapped supply, and now with the suggestion of a large reserve. These problems are the product of using a token to represent something that could instead be programmatically measured.

SDL’s utility is not complicated: it is the paid/earned gateway into limited staking space, and it receives a share of platform fees. It is the reward token for providing stLINK liquidity, which in turn means that the LP provider can stake more LINK using the SDL they earn. It is meant to be a driver of stLINK adoption and a fair mechanism for the public to stake their LINK tokens without being frontrun by bots.

Because the token does not provide node services, the question has always been how to fit stSDL revenue share into a system of revenue-generating nodes, leading to the current tokenomics. If we instead use a system that rewards nodes based on their activity, and simply state that stSDL = x # of nodes, we no longer have this problem, and I believe the system would become much more clear and approachable, both for stakers and for node operators. This has been made possible by new Chainlink services, which I also think provides a great opportunity to show off what Chainlink can do.

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I have a couple of concerns with this proposal.

  1. The increase of the Treasury’s holdings to 84,581,136 SDL is significant. This SDL will be disposed (sold) at some point, thereby increasing the circulating supply and impacting community SDL holders. I would add that this is a marked departure from the December 16, 2022 blogpost where the Treasury was going to be reduced to 370,000 SDL with any increase to be voted on! While this is mentioned in the opening post, it fails to raise other approaches or compromises such as a reduced Treasury, while allowing increased discretion.

This situation has been exacerbated by the recent SLURP-4 which will allow node operators to dispose their SDL after a vote from the Security Council. This disposed SDL will also enter the circulating supply. As I noted in that discussion, the Council is highly centralised with the developer team making up three of the seven positions and may make decisions to maintain or further business and personal relationships. As far as I am aware, of the four other Council members not on the core team, three have not engaged in SLURP discussions here.

The effect of an increased circulating SDL supply for community holders means greater downward pressure on price and reduced fees from lending staking capacity.

  1. The other issue (as Fox and ryan raise) is that the distribution of SDL to new participants seems rather ad hoc. I would think that the best way to deal with this would be that the amount of SDL given to an node operator reflects the actual LINK staking capacity they provide. Maybe the 15 node operators can have a bonus amount due to their early participation but clarity going forward would be helpful.

Or stated simply: each stLINK of capacity provided by a node operator gives them x stSDL. The 15 initial node operators could be given a 5% bonus.

  • There is still a lot of negative sentiment towards the project on social media which I fear is not just impacting stake.link but also Chainlink (who still have not publicly acknowledged their involvement with the protocol). Perhaps some of this supply expansion (if it takes place) could be directed towards the community in a further attempt to pacify and remedy the situation. 14m SDL (a second SLURP-3 airdrop in effect) from the Treasury allocation perhaps?
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“Treasury usage in excess of 250,000 SDL will require a SLURP detailing intended usage”
I’d be for altering this to add language the creates a USD cap. Right now that amount is about $60k, but I would be less ok with 7 figure arrangements without governance approval at a $4 SDL.
“Treasury usage in excess of 250,000 SDL or $250,000 will require a SLURP detailing intended usage”
I’m open to discussing what the USD equivalent would be to not handcuff the team. It doesn’t need to be $250k.

Also, what’s the plan for transparency regarding the amounts distributed without a formal slurp? How will this be communicated?

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Hey all, thanks so much for sharing your thoughts on this SLURP.

Also, great suggestion regarding pegging the treasury disbursement limit to USD value OR token amount, @SethVdL!

As stated in the Motivation section of this SLURP, the intention of this proposal is to provide some additional clarity and predictability to the tokenomics of SDL, especially with respect to supply and future supply expansion.

It seems generally like there hasn’t been a strongly positive response to this - and obviously I’d like to discuss each point further with each of you. I’ll do that tomorrow. But additionally, tomorrow I’m going to stand up a non-binding signaling vote to get a clearer picture of overall community sentiment for SLURP-5. It’ll be an open vote based on SDL/stSDL/lp’d SDL balances and will run for 7 days.

Looking forward to seeing the results!

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The aforementioned Community Sentiment Poll for SLURP-5 is now live! Please vote and let us know what you think.

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I like the overall idea of reshaping some key aspects of the tokenomics to bring more clarity, and many of the proposed changes make a lot of sense. However, I am concerned about the long-term adaptability of the proposed design.

I share many of @Fox’s thoughts on this topic, and I can’t help but think about what might happen once staking expands to most or all Chainlink services. If node A is doing xy jobs and Node B is doing yz, it’s likely that each node will have its own allotment size and APY over the long term. If the SDL distribution among nodes isn’t well-aligned, it could create friction in onboarding new Chainlink node operators or obtaining new LINK allotments from existing node operators within the SDL ecosystem.

While I understand that leveraging the clawback mechanism could lead to an automated redistribution mechanism, this doesn’t seem like a very gas-friendly solution.

I recognize that I am making assumptions about future iterations of Chainlink staking and welcome any feedback in this regard. I would be happy to further expand on the design choices that I believe could eventually make sense.

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Agreed, and this is specifically called out in the SLURP. The intention would always be to properly incentivize newly joining Providers and bring a net benefit to the overall platform by onboarding them.

Always very interested in hearing your thoughts Ari!

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Hi all,

Glad we are seeing some additional SLURP around token economic and total supply.

Wanted to throw in some thoughts and say that I hope for the moment this SLURP won’t pass without improvement.

Following the discussion, the main problem I see that nobody seems to want to address is the revenue/viability of the protocol itself :

Q. Why would future node operators use stake.link and pay a cut of their revenue?

From what I read looks like the only reason is (1) to throw money at them :

We’ve speculated about issuing 5-8M SDL per Chainlink Node Operator for the next batch of Providers that join the platform. Supposing a batch of 15 joined, this could be anywhere from 75-120M.

and (2) hoping it creates a positive flywheel in stacked LINK → LINK revenue (speculative for now)

if it would clearly result in an increase of rewards per SDL based on the additional LINK staking capacity (and therefore LINK staked) afforded by the new round of Providers

Now question is, why the DAO should be throwing money (SDL) at Node operator to use the platform? Shouldn’t the platform in itself be attractive and provide unmatched value? Am I missing something?

Now if the protocol is not yet at this stage, then having incentives to get there make sense, but no money is created of thin air and diluting even more one of the most illiquid DAO is not the right solution. Even by small 200k-250k treasury approval. The market at this stage can’t supply what is asked dollar wise.

Now just some thoughts, since node operators were given each 3.8% of the initiale supply and are the one stuck in a illiquid bootloop agree to pool their SDL to finance DAO initiative to boost value (whatever value is)? They are the one with the most stake after all.

Small recap :

  1. Fixing/Improving the value flywheel of stake.link should be the main target at the moment.
    1.1 Where does the outside revenue/value come from? AND how does it add value to SDL?

  2. stake.link should be so technically advanced and liquid that future node operators should be the one buying SDL of the market to join (benefiting everyone)

  3. Supply is already big enough. Initial initiatives should be financed by current participants. If the initiates that are approved really create values, then it shouldn’t be an issue. Remember the the initial initiatives should be the one creating the most benefits after all. Small steps big impacts.

I do understand that kickstarting the protocol with stacking v0.1 limits is harder said than done, but I do not see where this SLURP fix bootstrapping + creating value issues.

Additional : In the event where SDL would be used for additional yield on certain pools to create liquidity, certains part of the SLURP would make sense. I do believe that before then we need to have a solid match plan to incentive liquidity only where composability would allow exponential growth and partnerships.

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I agree with the general thrust of your post in that the SDL team could explain in their own words how their system will serve present and future NOPs, and in turn why it will be attractive to stakers.

I disagree with the characterization that issuance of locked stSDL amounts to dilution. NOPs have not sold any SDL, there is clearly no intention to sell any time soon, originally such tokens were set to be vested and that notion has since been consigned to oblivion. New NOPs’ token allocations would not enter the circulating supply. Hence why I am a proponent of splitting the token system (and expanding the Treasury) to make the distinction between “liquid SDL” and “node SDL” clear.

The present cohort is already giving up their v.0.1 LINK staking allocations. There is, in the immediate term, no benefit to doing this; they are investing in the success of stLINK, with the expectation that it will become the de facto LINK LSD.

Rather than gating nodes through SDL, what I would like to see is a way for nodes to join as easily as possible. I agree that stakedotlink should be so attractive that nodes want to join, and preferably I would like to see stakedotlink become a gateway for new nodes that would otherwise have no way of building reputation. But all of this would require refactoring based on entirely immature technology, and if the platform is interested in expanding now, they have the choice of either making judicious use of the mint function, or just minting a lot of tokens all at once to represent future node participation.

Personally, rather than terming this SLURP a “solidification of supply economics”, I would prefer that it be considered a stopgap measure until a smart contract alternative becomes practical.

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